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1. History of globalization:  
• main feature of the development of 
mankind;  
• overarching development (security, 
economics, environment, technology, 
communication, human behaviour); 
• globalization vs. de-globalization 
(short- and longer-term benefits and 
dangers) (e.g. dramatic decrease of 
„deep poverty” vs. dramatic increase 
of wealth (not just income!) gap); 
• focusing on the economy (7,6 bn 
people with global GDP of 90.000 bn 
USD). Different degree of globalization 
of trade in commodities, services, 
capital flows, spread of technology, 
free flow of labour. Key contradiction: 
almost 100 % free movement of 
capital vs. 3 % of labour permanently 
living and working outside his/her 
native country. This huge gap cannot 
be maintained. Some restrictions of 
capital will be accompanied by rapidly 
increasing (voluntary and forced) 
migration (doubling in the next 15 to 
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20 years to 6 % of world population). 
Is the international community 
prepared?; 
• understanding globalization: 
complexity, qualitative 
interdependence (forget about 
„national sovereignty” and focus on 
national+regional identity) and in-built 
interdisciplinarity (e.g. economic 
policy decisions have a number of 
non-economic – political, social, 
institutional, regional and even 
mental consequences, similar to 
political, institutional, legal, social 
policy decisions); 
• most policy-makers are absolutely 
unprepared to face this triple 
challenge, aggravated by accelerated 
time, appearance of new technologies 
and the impact of global 
communication networks). Is 
humanity/mankind really prepared for 
these unique challenges and find the 
right and common answers – or the 
fundamental risk of the revival of 
„tribal instincts” – with unpredictable 
consequences; 
• therefore: our common task and 
responsibility consists in „investment 
into the innovative society”. Among 
others, I mean openness vs. closing 
down, cooperation vs. polarization, 
inclusion vs. exclusion, solidarity vs. 
hatred, future-oriented attitude vs. 
flight into the not so „glorious” past, 
self-responsibility vs. blaming others, 
development of flexible adjustment 
capacities vs. explaining why change is 
impossible (due to external and 
internal enemies); 
• The successful development of the 
„innovative society” has to be 
accompanied by the appreciation of 
social sciences (integrated in an 
interdisciplinary network). 
 
2. Global economy and COVID-19: 
• short-term direct impacts (dramatic 
decline of economic growth, 
disruption of global value chains, 
paralysis of selected service sectors, 
such as tourism, international traffic, 
hotel and restaurant chains, rapidly 
increasing unemployment); 
• current crisis, for several reasons, 
cannot be compared to the financial 
crisis of 2008: it is not financial but 
affecting the entire structure of the 
economy, in 2008 global value chains 
remained largely intact and 
international trade could jump back to 
pre-crisis levels in less than 2 years, in 
2008 China had a 10 per cent growth 
rate and could act as a „saver” – today 
Chinese economic growth is just about 
1 per cent, today economic (and 
social) interdependence is 
qualitatively higher than 12 years 
ago);  
• the current crisis has been aggravated 
by previously started developments 
which have just reached a critical 
turning point (technological change, 
new conditions of employment, 
structural changes in the car industry 
both on the demand and the supply 
side, unsettled issues of the 
international financial system, new-
born trade protectionism mainly 
fuelled by the Trump administration, 
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growing social and mental 
uncertainty/desorientation caused by 
contradicting communication 
messages and outspoken fake-news 
which increase the camp of „believers 
in simple solutions”; 
• longer- (medium-) term impacts to be 
managed: impact of huge rescue 
packages on national households and 
on the international financial system 
(currently economic support provided 
against the negative impacts of the 
pandemic reaches 11.000 bn USD, or 
12 % of global GDP), how long can 
rescue packages be sustained, how 
strong is the crisis-resistance of 
companies, how long can 
unemployment be financed, how long 
can the financial capacity (previously 
accumulated savings) of different 
strata of the society (employed and 
unemployed people, pensioners) 
resist longer-term negative impacts of 
the crisis, how to phase-out supports 
and how to select competitive and 
future-oriented companies (and 
employees) from rent-seeking 
activities supported by temporary or 
lasting subventions. In sum, how long 
will the crisis last and the recovery 
start. Slow and delayed recovery, 
which seems more and more 
plausible, could further aggravate the 
economic and not least social costs of 
the crisis and make the management 
of huge budget deficits even more 
difficult or impossible – with state and 
company bankruptcies, competitive 
devaluation and rapidly rising 
inflation; 
• little attention has been devoted to 
the massive reemergence of extreme 
poverty in many countries mainly 
based on industrial subcontracting 
and international tourism (rise of 
about 50 to 60 mn people as the 
immediate consequence of the crisis) 
which could end up in social 
disturbances and growing 
international/regional security risks; 
• longer-term uncertainties (maybe 
with positive outcome) include 
technological breakthroughs (not least 
in the healthcare system), new quality 
of international cooperation 
(redefining the priorities or create 
new global institutions, correcting 
some basic distortions created by 
globalization, strengthening 
multilateralism), new forms of 
employment saving costs and 
increasing efficiency (home office) but 
with unknown social consequences 
due to the lack of personal contacts, 
regional and structural transformation 
of global value chains with higher 
value-added and changing selection of 
partners, cleaning of the environment 
due to less air- and sea-bond 
transportation, fundamental 
rethinking of income/wealth 
redistribution, including the 
introduction of (universal) basic 
income schemes, management of the 
cross-national new divide between 
metropolitan and rural areas; 
• However, at the moment we have 
more questionmarks than policy 
solutions. The future largely depends 
on the duration of the crisis, a new 
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quality of international cooperation, 
global, regional and local solidarity (it 
is a two-way street!), and, last but not 
least, on the development of an 
„innovative society” based on 
successful „mental revolution” of the 
mankind. 
 
3. Some remarks on the European Union-
27:  
• the EU’s global role (6 % of world 
population, 17 % of global GDP but 
dependent on the Euro/USD exchange 
rate, 70 per cent of GDP produced by 
service sectors, leading global trading 
bloc, constant role of Euro in global 
reserves (about 28 %) and rapidly 
growing role in international 
transactions (almost 50 % and 
increasing, see Russia-China trade 
transformed from USD to Euro most 
recently);  
• immediate reaction to COVID-19 by 
member states, due to the fact that 
healthcare has not been part of EU-
level decisions and the pandemic 
came suddenly without any serious 
preparation. Resilience of national 
health systems proved to be different 
and national policy measures were 
not coordinated (see the collapse of 
the Schengen system); 
• as compared to previous periods, the 
EU woke up much earlier and took 
several crisis management measures, 
including the Recovery Fund (Euro 
390+360 bn) and the acceleration of 
the MFF 2021-27 (Euro 1100 bn for 
the seven-year period) talks, new 
priorities for a future-oriented EU 
(environment, digitalization, 
education, R&D, growing role as a 
global player); 
• apparent breakthrough in several key 
areas: steps towards a fiscal union 
(Recovery Fund to be financed by 
European Union deficits, debt 
mutualization), necessity of creating 
new „own resources”, community-
level control of financial flows 
(including the creation of the 
European Prosecution Office), 
(ambiguous) efforts to link EU 
financial transfers to the rule-of-law 
requirements, abolition of national 
veto-rights and growing role of 
qualified majority voting strongly 
supported by the European 
Parliament. Such steps, if 
consequently implemented, can lead 
to a more federal EU structure and a 
manageable „differentiated 
integration”; 
• At the same time, the EU keeps on 
struggling with inherited (and partly 
new) challenges. On the internal 
front: Brexit, reducing the imbalance 
between monetary and fiscal union, 
implementation of a very ambitious 
green deal when at least partial 
redistribution of the money available 
seems unavoidable towards other and 
more burning issues, harmonization of 
economic, social, institutional and 
legal tasks, each with different time 
dimension – can a solution be found 
to reconcile urgent economic and 
social priorities with a much slower 
moving legal-institutional structure? 
Can the latter become sufficiently 
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flexible without losing confidence and 
credibility, a key element of systemic 
solidity and resilience? Last but not 
least, how to manage growing 
Eurosceptic and even openly anti-EU 
policies of some member countries as 
well as in parts of the cross-EU 
society? On the external side the 
development of relations with China 
(cooperation in keeping 
multilateralism alive, EU-China 
investment treaty, impact of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, China’s growing 
interest in euro and – hopefully – in a 
strong European Union with 
characteristics of a global player – an 
indispensable element of China’s 
„multipolar world” for the 21st 
century), Russia, increasingly 
explosive geographic neighbourhood 
(from Belarus through Turkey to North 
Africa), what kind of security anchor 
(being France the only nuclear power 
after Brexit, future of transatlantic 
relations), clear and sustainable EU-




FORESIGHT SESSION: EASTERN 
EUROPE & BULGARIA NAVIGATING 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
The foresight sessions on the topic 
“Eastern Europe & Bulgaria Navigating 
Uncertainty” aimed at outlining post-COVID 
scenarios for the future of Bulgaria, Eastern 
Europe and the EU by 2030. For the 
development of the scenarios, the SSS2020 
participants used the Scenario Building 2x2 
Matrix Technique, including the choice of 
two key tendencies, characterized 
simultaneously by great significance and a 
high dose of uncertainty. By facilitating this 
mental exercise, EPI leveraged the collective 
wisdom and creativity of a unique expert 
pool of participants, who embraced this 
interactive task with great enthusiasm and 
as a result interesting and thought-
provoking scenarios were developed. 
Utilizing a specialy designed digital 
whiteboard for developing the scenarios, 
each of the six groups outlined four 
alternative scenarios based on the chosen 
two key tendencies, illustrating them with 
interesting sound-tracks, collages and tailor-
made stories describing the main 
characteristics of each of the scenarios, as 
well as their potential impact on the life of 
an average Bulgarian, Eastern European or 
European. 
Herewith, the scenarios of the two groups 
working on the topic for the post-COVID 
future of the Eastern Europe are 
represented. EPI publishes the versions as 
submitted by participants:  
 
GROUP 1: POST-COVID FUTURE OF 
EASTERN EUROPE BY 2030 
Authors: Andrei Palade, Arxhilda Rringaj, 
Goran Georgiev, Snezhana Rangelova, 
Viktoriya Petrova  
 
Group 1’s task was to outline four different 
scenarios for the post-COVID future of 
Eastern Europe by 2030. Group members 
focused their discussions on the countries 
from the Western Balkans, the Eastern 
Partnership and the EU member countries in 
the region. EPI publishes the version as 
submitted by participants:  
We chose the following two main indicators 
for outlining the scenarios: 1) Biopolitics 
(the extent to which the governments in the 
region choose to apply restrictive measures 
such as declaring a state of emergency, 
lockdown, travel restrictions and limited 
access to urban centers); 2) Economic 
Prosperity (the extent to which the health 
crisis has affected economic indicators such 
as economic growth, job opportunities, 
investments, free movement of goods and 
capital and whether the economy is 
recovering rapidly or slowly). 
The First Scenario called „2030 is the new 
1984”, characterized by strong biopolitics 
and low prosperity, was considered the 
worst-case scenario for the development of 
Eastern Europe. In this scenario, a strong 
authoritarian government is observed, 
which applies extremely strict measures in 
order to protect the health of the 
population. As a result of these measures, 
the economic development of the region is 
slowing down sharply, and the economic 
recovery is happening much slower than 
expected by the experts. All of this also 
